Be modestly forwarded: this is longer than my usual blog post but not contentious.
Was intrigued to learn a new-to-me definition of consciousness from the two Dark Horse Postcasters, Heather Heying and Bret Weinstein, who are also joint authors of A Hunter-Gatherer's Guide to the 21st Century (2021). The definition is new because I have not read the book (nor do I plan to). As detailed in the podcast, consciousness is "that portion of cognition packaged for exchange." Since I'm not exactly an ingénue on the subject, the definition gave me immediate pause. The acknowledged lens or filter through which their often wearying analyses proceed is evolutionary biology, which offers a readymade perspective on the nascent study of historical consciousness. They do not acknowledge so-called "consciousness studies" in the podcast. As I have opined in the past, most of those inquiries are entirely conjectural owing to the historical record leaving incomplete clues as to the manner in which ancients were conscious, which differs considerably from modernity because consciousness is tied inescapably to contemporary culture. With that in mind, I suspect the definition applies only to modern consciousness, a notoriously moving target. Now that I've paused sufficiently to consider the definition, I find it necessary to divide into four parts: (1) that (2) portion of cognition (3) packaged (4) for exchange. Let me consider each in turn.
Perhaps it's merely stylistic, but that caused me to stop and consider demonstrative pronouns this/that (and their plurals these/those) vs. the generic article the signaling the subject phrase that follows. I didn't find it particularly worthwhile to puzzle for long over suggested options (e.g., in here vs. over there) and came to no conclusion. I'm perfectly fine with portion of cognition as a subset of all cognition. Typical binary metaphors to communicate a large hidden portion of cognition include the modest percentage of an iceberg that floats above the water line vs. below, the clock face vs. the interior mechanisms that move the hands, and the travel of a vehicle vs. motor activity under the hood. A mixture of above/below, after/before, and outer/inner concepts are employed. Orientation along a presumed vertical axis is probably the most common. The terms unconscious, subconscious, and preconscious also apply, though how they differ exactly is unclear to me (another puzzle not worth the time and not unpacked in the discussion of the above definition). The unhidden portion of cognition is the content(s) of consciousness (Sam Harris' rather bland term). The embedded container metaphor is worth noting as well as the false binary.
The phrase packaged is clumsy at best and suggests bits and bytes of information transmitted over a network in, well, packets or other chunks. I find it clumsy because while the brain (and its cognitive functions) is typically misunderstood as a central processing unit (CPU) -- a computer metaphor -- linear, serial, indefatigable, accurate (digital) processing is not characteristic of human cognition (or that of other animals). Rather, human cognition is characterized by approximation, with a surprisingly large quotient of perceptual and/or processing error. Cognition is organized around conservation of effort/energy and the heuristic of sufficiency. In short, that means "good enough for now, subject to correction" -- correction often never occurring if pressing reasons to revisit fail to present themselves. ("Was that a snake? No matter, I reacted as though it were and am safe.") To rise above low-cognition approximation to a higher level of depth and accuracy (read: rationality) requires concerted effort and training (the pose of objectivity) and increases cognitive load substantially. In addition, although one can discern differences in degree between thinking hard and low-level steady states (coasting along), cognition does not lend itself well to precise quantification much the same way pains and emotions cannot be judged or plotted on a scale too accurately. Thus, what goes into the presumed package, large or small, is quite unclear beyond its having been raised to awareness.
Which brings me to the false binary. The conscious/unconscious/preconscious/subconscious divisions of cognition typically suppose a clear division between what enters consciousness and what remains hidden. Let me propose a bridge category of passively conscious or liminal consciousness that requires little or no attention but hovers at the threshold. Bodily perceptual feedback that regulates movement and sight in particular are passive, thoughtless, and automatic but arguably require ongoing cognitive processing during wakefulness. Focus on the center of the field of vision is prioritized prosaically while the periphery is mostly unattended unless something is promoted into the center of focus, stray movement being primary among attention-grabbing stimuli. Similarly, nerve endings arrayed throughout the body (and the skin surface) provide continuous feedback but are typically brought to the center of attention only when, for instance, pain is felt or balance is in danger of being lost. In such cases, awareness snaps to those otherwise passive attributes of cognition. Attention to any part of the body can also be directed volitionally. Using the iceberg metaphor, I suggest that dividing cognition neatly into above and below the water line ignores the water line itself, which possesses surface tension and thus its own unique properties. Perhaps liminal consciousness is the portion of cognition suspended just below full awareness but above the hidden portion until stimuli reposition something at the center of focus. Further, the bridge layer concerns safety and self-regulation and is not particularly directed to exchange.
Finally, the for exchange part of the definition takes note of human hypersociality but links to the intellectual realm (the stream of consciousness or the self-narrative moderns experience but premoderns may not have), with language being the primary mediator. As I understand it, the definition skips past proxemics, which exist in either the bridge layer or the fully hidden, unconscious part of perception and cognition. Walking down a corridor (with socially constructed traffic rules) or in a less structured environment (a crowd, say) is a rather elaborate dance performed without what one might consider intellectual processing. Even more sophisticated coordination of, say, a basketball team at play (even more embedded rules) evidences highly refined court sense, but it's mostly nonverbal and intuitive, meaning out of conscious awareness. In addition, tracking eye movements and eye lines and entrainment in emotional vibes (e.g., the humor of comedy or the chaotic irrationalism of the mob) are largely unconscious, though entrainment can be quite palpable when emotions run hot such as the excitement and/or euphoria of a sports competition or musical performance, both entailing large crowds. These perceptions occur continuously when in the midst of crowds but are only infrequently part of full consciousness.
My improved definition (if I can be so bold) is this: "the portion of cognition raised (or brought, promoted) to either liminal or full awareness." Like the term packaged, raised, brought, and promoted call into being an agent of change the same way religious traditions call into being a designer or creator when mentioning the design or creation of organisms. The theory of evolution (to which not everyone subscribes) posits an alternative mechanism to designer/creator but often retains the confounding language. Similarly, I don't subscribe to the notion of a deus ex machina inside of consciousness coordinating the activity of cognition (Daniel Dennett's inner imp beholding the Cartesian theater). Consciousness, despite all the attention lavished upon it for 3,000+ years, remains a black-box curiosity. I'm perfectly comfortable acknowledging imprecision and paradox.
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